Showing posts with label Scottish Election Survey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Scottish Election Survey. Show all posts

27 August 2012

Women and Alex Salmond: An academic postscript...

Last week, I took a skeptical look at the received wisdom, echoed most recently by the Economist magazine, that women in Scotland aren't terrifically keen on Alex Salmond. Trawling through polls going back to 2009, and looking at how satisfaction with his performance broke down by gender, I argued that the data suggests something of an "enthusiasm gap" for the First Minister.  Men like him more than women, but Scottish women did not assess his activities in Bute House significantly more negatively than Scottish men.  He comfortably drubs Cameron, Miliband, Clegg, Davidson, Rennie and Lamont amongst both men and women.

In response, one of the authors directed my attention towards a paper very recently published in the academic journal, Political Parties. For those interested and able to access it, the precise citation is: Robert Johns, Lynn Bennie and James Mitchell (2012) ‘Gendered nationalism: The gender gap in support for the Scottish National Party’ Party Politics 18(4) 581 – 601.  The piece focusses on the Holyrood election result of 2007.  According to the Scottish Election Survey for that year, 35% of men voted for the SNP on the regional list, compared to 27% of women. As we saw in the preliminary data released from the 2011 Scottish Election Survey, the SNP managed to close this gap to just 3% in the most recent Holyrood ballot, with 43% of women and 46% of men voting for the Nationalists on the list respectively.

Bracketing these recent developments, the Political Parties article examines alternative explanations for the gap we saw in 2007. (Johns, Bennie and Mitchell's conclusion, incidentally, is that men are more likely than women to vote for the SNP because men are more likely than women to support independence, for whatever reasons).  Amongst the factors considered by the authors was Alex Salmond's leadership. Were women "not keen", or at least less "keen" on him than men?  Here's the critical section:

“Here the SES (“Scottish Election Survey”) evidence comes from a series of leadership ratings on an 11-point like-dislike scale. The mean male rating of Salmond was around half a point higher than the mean female rating, a difference which appears more substantial in the light of the general tendency for women to report more positive evaluations. Salmond was the only politician included in the survey to elicit significantly higher ratings from male respondents. The upshot is that, where leader evaluations are controlled, the net gender gap narrows by around one-third. Two points are worth noting about this. Firstly while females were less positive than males about the SNP leader, they nonetheless rated him more highly in absolute terms than any of the other politicians. The implication is that, insofar as leadership can be account for the gender gap in SNP voting, this is because Salmond won support from men rather than losing it among women. Second, leadership evaluations are likely to be causally posterior to some of the factors already considered. For example, it could be that males preferred Alex Salmond because he led a party to which they were already particularly favourably disposed, perhaps because they share the SNP’s preference for independence. In that case, differences in leadership evaluations are a by-product and not a cause of the gender gap under study here.” [Johns, Bennie and Mitchell 2012, 588]

Quite coincidentally, this tallies rather neatly with the idea of an "enthusiasm gap" captured in the Ipsos-MORI polling on Salmond we were looking at last week, and gives the lie to the Economist's rather sketchy, rather crude assessment of the political sensibilities of female Scots. What is left unanswered, however, is why the devil women remain more reticent about independence than men.  The authors admit they don't know.  Neither do I.

If Johns, Bennie and Mitchell's thesis is correct, however, and the gender gap in SNP support in the 2007 election is attributable to a gender gap in support for independence, the changes in the Nationalists' electoral fortunes between 2011 and 2007 may repay close study for YesScotland.  After all, during this period of time, the party's constitutional policies were basically unaltered.  If the female vote faltered for the SNP in 2007, and more or less caught up with men in 2011, something must have changed. It may well be, however, that the two elections were simply fought in different terms, concerned with different priorities, and women's disagreement with independence was mostly just de-emphasised rather than altered or eliminated as a factor weighing against supporting the Nationalists between their tentative first and thumping second victories.

If something along these lines is the case, and the gist of the Jones, Bennie and Mitchell thesis holds for 2011 as in 2007, the SNP managed strongly to attract women's votes despite their attitudes to independence in the last election. In 2014, YesScotland faces a far more daunting task: to attract women to independence, despite independence. No pressure.

5 September 2011

That latest TNS-BMRB poll on Scottish independence...

From summer drought to Autumn monsoon! After the full Scottish poll from Ipsos-MORI, which I took apart in a little bit of detail yesterday, the clouding over of the inscrutable firmament of public opinion has ended. With a splash to delight obsessives, the pitter-patter of opinion is pelting down on us again. (I'm conscious that for readers based in Scotland, they may struggle to connect this metaphor of drought to their experiences of the weather over the past few months, rejoicing in the ironic title of Summer. Think of it as moving from June smirr to September drizzle).  

Take your pick which you find more interesting. Over today and yesterday, the attitude-tabulating folk at TNS-BMRB have published the detail of two of their polls, the first commissioned by the Scottish Government, the second by the Herald newspaper.  While Scottish Ministers were particularly interested in attitudes towards sectarianism and its legal regulation, the newspaper wanted to know what folk make of the idea of Scottish independence. The independence poll sampled the opinions of 1,007 folk between the 24th and 31st of August, while the sectarianism poll questioned 1,028 people between the 27th of July and the 3rd of August. In the interests of giving both studies the space they deserve, I propose briefly to deconstruct the independence polling here, and return to the results of the sectarianism enquiry later in the week. The headline in the paper this morning proved suitably dramatic "Yes voters take lead in Scottish independence poll". As memory serves, the most recent poll on the question of Scottish independence was also conducted by TNS-BMRB and was published in June 2011.  I looked at some of its below-the-topline detail here. In the interests of continuity, beside the results of today's poll, I'll add the change from the pollster's findings of June.

TNS-BMRB asked their respondents the following "The SNP have outlined their plans for a possible referendum on Scottish independence in the future. If such a referendum were to be held tomorrow, how would you vote?" Respondents could declare themselves for or agin the idea of the Scottish Government negotiating "a settlement with the Government of the  UK so that Scotland becomes an independent state". For the indecisive, there was always "don't know". That produced the topline results, emphasised in the press:

All respondents...
  • Agree  ~ 39% (+2%)
  • Disagree ~ 38% (7%)
  • Don't know ~ 23% (+5%)

What about gendered differences in attitudes towards independence? Overall, TNS-BMRB found...

Men...
  • Agree  ~ 43% (-)
  • Disagree ~ 40% (5%)
  • Don't know ~ 17% (+4%)
Women...
  • Agree  ~ 36% (+4%)
  • Disagree ~ 36% (9%)
  • Don't know ~ 28% (+5%)

While yesterday's Ipsos-MORI poll did have a breakdown of its findings by affluence (which I didn't discuss in the body of my post), it didn't use the social gradings you may be familiar with from the YouGov polls before the Holyrood election, which predicted the movement in working class voters away from Labour towards the SNP which seems to have been confirmed by the preliminary findings of the Scottish Election Survey 2011. TNS-BMRB use the same social grading we saw in the YouGov polling. If you need reminding, here's a brief account of the rationale for these rather unrefined social grades. On independence, how did it turn out?

AB...
  • Agree  ~ 37% (+8%)
  • Disagree ~ 49% (9%)
  • Don't know ~ 14% (+1%)
C1...
  • Agree  ~ 37% (+3%)
  • Disagree ~ 42% (8%)
  • Don't know ~ 21% (+5%)
C2...
  • Agree  ~ 38% (+1%)
  • Disagree ~ 38% (4%)
  • Don't know ~ 24% (+3%)
DE...
  • Agree  ~ 44% (+1%)
  • Disagree ~ 27% (8%)
  • Don't know ~ 29% (+7%)

Next, take age. The last independence poll indicated advancing hostility towards independence as you sidled through the generations, with the young folk being more up for Scotland assuming sovereignty, while the more ancient felt that we oughtn't.  As before, the first number given is the result from today's poll, the figure in brackets being the change in the results since early June this year.

18-24...
  • Agree ~ 40% (11%)
  • Disagree ~ 32% (4%)
  • Don't know ~ 27% (+14%)
25-34...
  • Agree ~ 46% (+6%)
  • Disagree ~ 23% (13%)
  • Don't know ~ 31% (+7%)
35-44...
  • Agree ~ 47% (+9%)
  • Disagree ~ 32% (4%)
  • Don't know ~ 21% (6%)
45-54...
  • Agree ~ 38% (1%)
  • Disagree ~ 39% (8%)
  • Don't know ~ 23% (+9%)
55-64...
  • Agree ~ 37% (+6%)
  • Disagree ~ 41% (12%)
  • Don't know ~ 22% (+6%)
65+ ...
  • Agree ~ 31% (+3%)
  • Disagree ~ 53% (4%)
  • Don't know ~ 16% (+1%)

Finally, on its last outing, the independent poll produced some surprising regional differences. In areas where the SNP prosper well such as the North East, independence was opposed. By contrast, in Glasgow - and the traditional fastnesses of Labour Unionists, only shaken in May, the favoured option was independence. It is worth bearing in mind that in each case, we are only talking about a hundred or so folk per folk. We should not, therefore, be hugely surprised if the results produced appear volatile and shifting in nature.  A few months on, across the eight Holyrood regions, the pollsters found...

Highlands and Islands...
  • Agree ~ 45% (+20%)
  • Disagree ~ 33% (14%)
  • Don't know ~ 22% (6%)
North East...
  • Agree ~ 45% (+7%)
  • Disagree ~ 28% (17%)
  • Don't know ~ 27% (+10%)
Mid-Scotland and Fife...
  • Agree ~ 43% (+10%)
  • Disagree ~ 28% (13%)
  • Don't know ~ 29% (+3%)
Lothian...
  • Agree ~ 30% (4%)
  • Disagree ~ 46% (1%)
  • Don't know ~ 24% (+6%)
Central Scotland...
  • Agree ~ 39% (-)
  • Disagree ~ 38% (7%)
  • Don't know ~ 23% (+7%)
Glasgow...
  • Agree ~ 41% (5%)
  • Disagree ~ 42% (+3%)
  • Don't know ~ 17% (+2%)
West Scotland...
  • Agree ~ 46% (+5%)
  • Disagree ~ 40% (4%)
  • Don't know ~ 14% (2%)
South Scotland...
  • Agree ~ 30% (4%)
  • Disagree ~ 45% (8%)
  • Don't know ~ 25% (+12%)

The full TNS-BMRB tables.

29 June 2011

Scottish N(/n)ationalism & class-based politics...

A peaty crony recently sent me an account of a conversation overheard in a bar in the Southside of Glasgow.  The characters are a group of men in middle-to-late middle age. They are smartly dressed, prosperous, with a taste for the finer things in life. Natty watches hang from their joints and swanky shoes are an immediate concern. Sipping a second or third drink, they pass around plates of salade niçoise and moules marinières, discuss the architecture of British cathedrals - when their discussion noisily turns to the working classes. Despite their snobberies and their habits of consumption, none of the speakers show any remote sense of restraint discussing this topic. Their discussion isn't abashed with bourgeois fumblings and they do not envisage working class fellow-citizens as external observers might.  Despite their objective circumstances, and tastes, and manners, and expenditures - each of these men feels themselves to be, at bottom, working class characters.

During May's Holyrood election campaign, I analysed the SNP's party political broadcast with reference to this curious (and often Labour-voting) archetype, which I contended was very accurately depicted by the broadcast's skeptical protagonist, played by Jimmy Chisholm. A number of you found the lineaments of this character recognisable. Last week, I noted but didn't really delve into the class-based  data, generated by Professor James Mitchell et al in the Scottish Election Study 2011. One of the profoundly interesting aspects of the data as generated - positively inviting speculation - is its inclusion of subjective class-identifiers and a contrasting "objective" class identifier, which is to say, a consistent standard applied across the Study sample, based on the occupation of the head of household. These numbers are preliminary, borrowed from slides in which the researchers involved in the Study have presented their findings. Some important points of detail are absent - but this is a blog, not a peer-reviewed social scientific labour, so I don't have to feel too embarrassed about speculation and best-guesses. 

Firstly, the middle classes. I have written before about some of the curiosities which surround the Scotch bourgeois. They are often conceived as Anglicised - and by dint of that, of attenuated Scottishness - the burdens of national representation being devolved onto the working classes, often dominated by urban, west coast sounds and images. Although I have not enlarged on the proposition before here, one of the most irritating manifestations of this tendency is Scottish theatre. All too often, I have sat in middle class audiences, watching middle class actors perform material composed by middle class authors - cheerfully playing out yet another plucky-working-class-touchstone-of-authenticity type tale, without any sense of embarrassment. It is a complex issue, which I'm conscious that I'm only touching on here. I am certainly not attempting to make the case for banishing such material for our stages, nor indeed denying that such parliamo Glasgow offerings are without their charms. It is just the almost hegemonic status of such dramatic material and the delusions it fosters that I find problematic.  The crucial point is the tied presence and absence of the Scottish bourgeoisie. To paraphase (I think) Christopher Whyte or Cairns Craig, it conspires at its own invisibility.

There is also a curious gendered aspect of this. All credit to Gerry Hassan, one of the few folk in our public life to try to talk about Scottish masculinities. Gerry has contended that men are everywhere and nowhere - and that too often, we lack a vocabulary, range of images and narratives about what it means to be a Scottish man.  The same point can be made, forcibly, about Scottish bourgeois masculinities, which are doubly silenced, both on the gendered and classed register. I've made the point previously, in a closer look at some elements of the small body of gender research we have, which engages with Scotland. As some of you may know, for the time being, I live in Oxford. I am always surprised when folk tell me that the town is "very English", struck by the contrast with Edinburgh. Both places are strongly associated with their respective institutions of learning, representations of them overwhelmingly defined by their bourgeois citizens (in the case of the latter, prompting Irvine Welsh's strong dislocating reaction, in Trainspotting) . In English terms, Oxford is also very much part of the South - which are least suggests questions about who dominates representations of Englishness, who can claim to encapsulate its authentic qualities? While Oxford is able to assume such a national mantle without much difficulty, Edinburgh continues to be problematic. Pleasingly paradoxically, the Scottishness of the Scots capital is at best suspect - and has been for some time.  This is just a hastily composed gallimaufry - but I think begins to suggest some of the interest of thinking in a more nuanced way about the commonplace understandings of social class - and what is inexpressible or difficult to express, expelled from our public discourses by embarrassment or long neglect.

While the terse quantitative data of the Scottish Election Survey has limited explanatory potential in such a complex field - its findings are not without their impressionistic interest. Firstly, look at the data on subjective identification as middle class....

Respondents subjectively identifying as middle class...
  • SNP ~ 37%
  • Labour ~ 16%
  • Tories ~ 22%
  • Liberals ~ 8%
  • Greens ~ 9%
  • Others ~ 8%

And according to social grading's objective criteria...

AB voters (upper middle & middle classes)...
  • SNP ~ 41%
  • Labour ~ 25%
  • Tories ~ 14%
  • Liberals ~ 5%
  • Greens ~ 8%
  • Others ~ 7%

And...

C1 voters (lower middle classes)
  • SNP ~ 41%
  • Labour ~ 25%
  • Tories ~ 17%
  • Liberals ~ 8%
  • Greens ~ 6%
  • Others ~ 3%

Professor Mitchell's slides do not record the brute number of people we are talking about here - so it is impossible at this point to see whether subjective identifications as middle class are significantly smaller than those identified as such by "objective" social grading criteria. I suspect so. It is the discrepancies which strike me as particularly interesting. For example, amongst AB and C1 respondents, the Conservative vote is 14% and 17% respectively - but amongst those who subjectively identify as middle class, it runs between 5% and 8% higher at 22%. Although it would be important to look at how many folk we are actually talking about - these findings might suggest an interesting correlation between self-identifying as middle class and voting Tory. Certainly, in anecdotal form, I know a number of folk who recount the idea that certain people of their acquaintance started voting Tory, as a signifier of their conceit of themselves and place in the world. Further to the characters with which this blogpost opened, it is equally interesting to note that Labour support ran at 25% amongst AB and C1 voters - but only 16% of those subjectively identifying as bourgeois voted Labour. Again, we have to be careful here*. The SES data, as presently presented, doesn't allow us easily to compare across subjective and objective categories. We don't know the actual numbers of respondents in each group, so at the moment, we cannot tell for sure (but can guess) how far the objective and subjective class categories overlap. However, the fact that there is a 9% difference between objective classification as middle class, and subjective identification as middle class amongst Labour voters, might well suggest that a significant number of them either believe themselves to be working class, or abstain from a class-based analysis altogether. We'd have to see the figures and not just the percentages, to be sure. As those who read my post the other day will have seen, the working class data (subjective and objective) breaks down as follows...

Respondents subjectively identifying as working class...
  • SNP ~ 47%
  • Labour ~ 33%
  • Tories ~ 7%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 3%
  • Others ~ 6%
C2DE voters (working classes)...
  • SNP ~ 47%
  • Labour ~ 28%
  • Tories ~ 9%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 4%
  • Others ~ 8%

Again, we don't have numbers of respondents - only percentages - but a few interesting points can be picked up. Firstly, while the SNP vote is stable across subjective and objective categories - the Labour vote decreases by a not insignificant 5% when one moves into the objective register. Bluntly, 5% of the Labour vote conceives of itself as working class, but isn't according to occupational criteria. Interestingly, despite protestations to the contrary, the Greenies are attracting only tiny percentages amongst working class respondents, whether subjectively or objectively defined.  Finally, and in some respects, perhaps most interestingly, are the results under the third subjective class category - those who do not identify with any class at all. The data is striking:

Respondents subjectively identifying as having no class...
  • SNP ~ 53%
  • Labour ~ 17%
  • Tories ~ 14%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 4%
  • Others ~ 8%

A truly walloping lead for the Nationalists, 36% ahead of their nearest Labour rivals. There is a fascinating ideological aspect to this. One aspect of Scottish Nationalism - and indeed nationalism as such - which has historically concerned (some) socialists and communists, is its capacity to leech energy from the class struggle. In place of a united working class, contending against the rapacious bourgeoisie, you have nationalist division between English and Welsh and Scottish workers, whose energies are dispersed rather than united by a nationalist politics. I don't share the view - but I know a number of folk who would still hold to and proselytise for it. Unlike the social grading data and the subjective identifiers, we are unable at this point to set subjectivity beside objective criteria, and see how else we might categorise these "classless" respondent, and where in the brute boxes of ABC1 and C2DE most of them might fit - or how they are distributed across social grades. This is a pity, but it does pose a few pungent questions. First and foremost, what are the characteristics of these "classless voters"? Given how problematic middle-class identities can be in Scotland - indeed as I remember, David McCrone once suggested that there is a strong version of Scottish nationalism, which sees class as a wholly alien and English fixation - what does the SNP's majority amongst respondents of this character suggest about N(/n)ationalism's appeal?

Answers and speculation on a postcard, please...

*I'm obliged to James Mackenzie for pointing this out.

Scottish N(/n)ationalism & class-based politics...

A peaty crony recently sent me an account of a conversation overheard in a bar in the Southside of Glasgow.  The characters are a group of men in middle-to-late middle age. They are smartly dressed, prosperous, with a taste for the finer things in life. Natty watches hang from their joints and swanky shoes are an immediate concern. Sipping a second or third drink, they pass around plates of salade niçoise and moules marinières, discuss the architecture of British cathedrals - when their discussion noisily turns to the working classes. Despite their snobberies and their habits of consumption, none of the speakers show any remote sense of restraint discussing this topic. Their discussion isn't abashed with bourgeois fumblings and they do not envisage working class fellow-citizens as external observers might.  Despite their objective circumstances, and tastes, and manners, and expenditures - each of these men feels themselves to be, at bottom, working class characters.

During May's Holyrood election campaign, I analysed the SNP's party political broadcast with reference to this curious (and often Labour-voting) archetype, which I contended was very accurately depicted by the broadcast's skeptical protagonist, played by Jimmy Chisholm. A number of you found the lineaments of this character recognisable. Last week, I noted but didn't really delve into the class-based  data, generated by Professor James Mitchell et al in the Scottish Election Study 2011. One of the profoundly interesting aspects of the data as generated - positively inviting speculation - is its inclusion of subjective class-identifiers and a contrasting "objective" class identifier, which is to say, a consistent standard applied across the Study sample, based on the occupation of the head of household. These numbers are preliminary, borrowed from slides in which the researchers involved in the Study have presented their findings. Some important points of detail are absent - but this is a blog, not a peer-reviewed social scientific labour, so I don't have to feel too embarrassed about speculation and best-guesses. 

Firstly, the middle classes. I have written before about some of the curiosities which surround the Scotch bourgeois. They are often conceived as Anglicised - and by dint of that, of attenuated Scottishness - the burdens of national representation being devolved onto the working classes, often dominated by urban, west coast sounds and images. Although I have not enlarged on the proposition before here, one of the most irritating manifestations of this tendency is Scottish theatre. All too often, I have sat in middle class audiences, watching middle class actors perform material composed by middle class authors - cheerfully playing out yet another plucky-working-class-touchstone-of-authenticity type tale, without any sense of embarrassment. It is a complex issue, which I'm conscious that I'm only touching on here. I am certainly not attempting to make the case for banishing such material for our stages, nor indeed denying that such parliamo Glasgow offerings are without their charms. It is just the almost hegemonic status of such dramatic material and the delusions it fosters that I find problematic.  The crucial point is the tied presence and absence of the Scottish bourgeoisie. To paraphase (I think) Christopher Whyte or Cairns Craig, it conspires at its own invisibility.

There is also a curious gendered aspect of this. All credit to Gerry Hassan, one of the few folk in our public life to try to talk about Scottish masculinities. Gerry has contended that men are everywhere and nowhere - and that too often, we lack a vocabulary, range of images and narratives about what it means to be a Scottish man.  The same point can be made, forcibly, about Scottish bourgeois masculinities, which are doubly silenced, both on the gendered and classed register. I've made the point previously, in a closer look at some elements of the small body of gender research we have, which engages with Scotland. As some of you may know, for the time being, I live in Oxford. I am always surprised when folk tell me that the town is "very English", struck by the contrast with Edinburgh. Both places are strongly associated with their respective institutions of learning, representations of them overwhelmingly defined by their bourgeois citizens (in the case of the latter, prompting Irvine Welsh's strong dislocating reaction, in Trainspotting) . In English terms, Oxford is also very much part of the South - which are least suggests questions about who dominates representations of Englishness, who can claim to encapsulate its authentic qualities? While Oxford is able to assume such a national mantle without much difficulty, Edinburgh continues to be problematic. Pleasingly paradoxically, the Scottishness of the Scots capital is at best suspect - and has been for some time.  This is just a hastily composed gallimaufry - but I think begins to suggest some of the interest of thinking in a more nuanced way about the commonplace understandings of social class - and what is inexpressible or difficult to express, expelled from our public discourses by embarrassment or long neglect.

While the terse quantitative data of the Scottish Election Survey has limited explanatory potential in such a complex field - its findings are not without their impressionistic interest. Firstly, look at the data on subjective identification as middle class....

Respondents subjectively identifying as middle class...
  • SNP ~ 37%
  • Labour ~ 16%
  • Tories ~ 22%
  • Liberals ~ 8%
  • Greens ~ 9%
  • Others ~ 8%

And according to social grading's objective criteria...

AB voters (upper middle & middle classes)...
  • SNP ~ 41%
  • Labour ~ 25%
  • Tories ~ 14%
  • Liberals ~ 5%
  • Greens ~ 8%
  • Others ~ 7%

And...

C1 voters (lower middle classes)
  • SNP ~ 41%
  • Labour ~ 25%
  • Tories ~ 17%
  • Liberals ~ 8%
  • Greens ~ 6%
  • Others ~ 3%

Professor Mitchell's slides do not record the brute number of people we are talking about here - so it is impossible at this point to see whether subjective identifications as middle class are significantly smaller than those identified as such by "objective" social grading criteria. I suspect so. It is the discrepancies which strike me as particularly interesting. For example, amongst AB and C1 respondents, the Conservative vote is 14% and 17% respectively - but amongst those who subjectively identify as middle class, it runs between 5% and 8% higher at 22%. Although it would be important to look at how many folk we are actually talking about - these findings might suggest an interesting correlation between self-identifying as middle class and voting Tory. Certainly, in anecdotal form, I know a number of folk who recount the idea that certain people of their acquaintance started voting Tory, as a signifier of their conceit of themselves and place in the world. Further to the characters with which this blogpost opened, it is equally interesting to note that Labour support ran at 25% amongst AB and C1 voters - but only 16% of those subjectively identifying as bourgeois voted Labour. Again, we have to be careful here*. The SES data, as presently presented, doesn't allow us easily to compare across subjective and objective categories. We don't know the actual numbers of respondents in each group, so at the moment, we cannot tell for sure (but can guess) how far the objective and subjective class categories overlap. However, the fact that there is a 9% difference between objective classification as middle class, and subjective identification as middle class amongst Labour voters, might well suggest that a significant number of them either believe themselves to be working class, or abstain from a class-based analysis altogether. We'd have to see the figures and not just the percentages, to be sure. As those who read my post the other day will have seen, the working class data (subjective and objective) breaks down as follows...

Respondents subjectively identifying as working class...
  • SNP ~ 47%
  • Labour ~ 33%
  • Tories ~ 7%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 3%
  • Others ~ 6%
C2DE voters (working classes)...
  • SNP ~ 47%
  • Labour ~ 28%
  • Tories ~ 9%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 4%
  • Others ~ 8%

Again, we don't have numbers of respondents - only percentages - but a few interesting points can be picked up. Firstly, while the SNP vote is stable across subjective and objective categories - the Labour vote decreases by a not insignificant 5% when one moves into the objective register. Bluntly, 5% of the Labour vote conceives of itself as working class, but isn't according to occupational criteria. Interestingly, despite protestations to the contrary, the Greenies are attracting only tiny percentages amongst working class respondents, whether subjectively or objectively defined.  Finally, and in some respects, perhaps most interestingly, are the results under the third subjective class category - those who do not identify with any class at all. The data is striking:

Respondents subjectively identifying as having no class...
  • SNP ~ 53%
  • Labour ~ 17%
  • Tories ~ 14%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 4%
  • Others ~ 8%

A truly walloping lead for the Nationalists, 36% ahead of their nearest Labour rivals. There is a fascinating ideological aspect to this. One aspect of Scottish Nationalism - and indeed nationalism as such - which has historically concerned (some) socialists and communists, is its capacity to leech energy from the class struggle. In place of a united working class, contending against the rapacious bourgeoisie, you have nationalist division between English and Welsh and Scottish workers, whose energies are dispersed rather than united by a nationalist politics. I don't share the view - but I know a number of folk who would still hold to and proselytise for it. Unlike the social grading data and the subjective identifiers, we are unable at this point to set subjectivity beside objective criteria, and see how else we might categorise these "classless" respondent, and where in the brute boxes of ABC1 and C2DE most of them might fit - or how they are distributed across social grades. This is a pity, but it does pose a few pungent questions. First and foremost, what are the characteristics of these "classless voters"? Given how problematic middle-class identities can be in Scotland - indeed as I remember, David McCrone once suggested that there is a strong version of Scottish nationalism, which sees class as a wholly alien and English fixation - what does the SNP's majority amongst respondents of this character suggest about N(/n)ationalism's appeal?

Answers and speculation on a postcard, please...

*I'm obliged to James Mackenzie for pointing this out.

24 June 2011

Those Scottish Election Study headlines...

My thanks to the helpful Dr Christopher Carman for alerting me to the fact that some initial slides from the Scottish Election Study of 2011 have now been published.  Many of you will have seen the edition of BBC Newsnicht this week, which enjoyed an early sight of the Study's preliminary findings about May's Holyrood election. The research team of political scientists, based at the University of Strathclyde, describe their methodology thus:

"In 2011, the Scottish Election Study took the form of a two-wave internet panel survey, with data collection undertaken by YouGov. The aim of the study is to explain the decisions of Scottish voters on 5 May, both whether and for which party they voted. As well as voting behaviour, the survey questionnaires cover the following topics: attitudes to parties and leaders; issue opinions and evaluations; national identity; constitutional preferences; multilevel party identification; preferences for political compromise; socio-demographic characteristics. In addition to the pre/post-election panel, the 2011 SES also reinterviewed respondents to the 2007 Scottish Election Study."

Data collection took place in two waves, one before and one after election day. The first engaged with 2,046 respondents, with fieldwork being conducted in late April. The second wave occurred later in May, with 1,760 respondents. While analysis of the data is still ongoing, the research team have now made three sets of slides available online, laying out preliminary findings.

The first, from Dr Carman's presentation from a seminar at the University of Strathclyde held this week, looks at issues of turnout; the use of two ballot papers for constituency and regional votes in Holyrood 2011, and its comprehensibility; the abortive AV referendum and respondents understanding of the AV system - and finally, on the phenomenon of "multi-level party support" in Holyrood and Westminster, or to borrow a phrase from John McTernan, Scotland's "promiscuous", Bobbing John electorate.

Secondly, we have the University of Essex's Dr Rob Johns, who asks Why does ‘performance politics’ win Scottish elections? Johns submits that there are four key aspects of context: 1. The Scottish Parliament matters; 2. Class and party dealignment; 3. Ideological convergence and 4. Reshaping of the constitutional issue. The first limb focusses on how respondents envisage key policy areas, including law and order, health - and so on. Do they conceive of outcomes in these policy areas as being primarily due to the UK or the Scottish Government? Secondly, Johns looks at responses to the question “Do you usually think of yourself as being a supporter of one particular party?” While 44% of respondents said ‘no’, the study revealed that many said ‘yes’ then abstained or defected in the most recent Holyrood election. The third limb examines perceptions of "ideological convergence" between political parties. The fourth plucks out the issue of the constitution.“How do you think the return of an SNP minority government would affect the likelihood of independence?”, asked the research team. According to 1,784 respondents to the Study the return of an SNP minority administration would make independence...

  • Much more likely ~ 7% 
  • Bit more likely ~ 29%
  • No difference ~ 42% 
  • Bit less likely ~ 13% 
  • Much less likely ~ 9%
Johns then turns to look at credit and blame, party image - capable of strong government, united, in touch with ordinary people, keeps promises - followed by a comparative analysis of leader-party popularities. All interesting and very much worth a look.

Lastly, at least for now, we have Professor James Mitchell's slides, which deal with a couple of issues of particular interest to me - support for party by gender, and by social grading. In the interests of comparative brevity, I'll tease out the Study's findings on these two issues - and simply note the other findings, without much getting into them.  Those of you who stayed with me during the Holyrood campaign may remember my series of posts, looking at the disaggregated data in YouGov's pre-election polling, focussing throughout on gender and class. One striking feature of this series of polls was the thumping leads the SNP were recording amongst C2DE voters - those assessed to be working class based on the occupational criteria. The polls also tended to show a narrowing "gender gap" in the SNP support, with increasing percentages of women, minded to support the Nationalists. My interest in that subject goes back some time, with my first dedicated post on the topic dating from August 2010, filling out some of the context informing a column by former Salmond special advisor Jennifer Dempsie in the Scotland on Sunday, arguing that "winning over female voters" was "crucial to SNP ambitions". Unfortunately, the wider media didn't really pick up on these interesting trends in the course of the campaign.  If they had done so, the Study's conclusions would be much less surprising, extensively anticipated as they were.

Significantly, Professor Mitchell's study confirms YouGov's pre-election polling which suggested a narrowing gender gap and a significant lead amongst working class voters. According to the survey data collected by the Study, their respondents voted as follows, by gender (N.B. Mitchell is referring us to the Study data on regional voting in the 2011 Holyrood election).

Male respondents (SES)...
  • SNP ~ 46%
  • Labour ~ 24%
  • Tories ~ 12%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 6%
  • Others ~ 8%

And women...

Female respondents (SES)...
  • SNP ~ 43%
  • Labour ~ 29%
  • Tories ~ 12%
  • Liberals ~ 6%
  • Greens ~ 4%
  • Others ~ 6%

On social class, the Study asked about (a) subjective social class, namely how respondents self-identify and (b) objective social class, based on the familiar ABC1/C2DE categorisations I've discussed previously.  Firstly, the Scottish Election Study's working class data, subjectively then objectively defined:

Respondents subjectively identifying as working class...
  • SNP ~ 47%
  • Labour ~ 33%
  • Tories ~ 7%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 3%
  • Others ~ 6%
C2DE voters (working classes)...
  • SNP ~ 47%
  • Labour ~ 28%
  • Tories ~ 9%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 4%
  • Others ~ 8%

In brief, amongst those subjectively identifying as working class in the Election Survey, the SNP beat Labour by 14%. According to social grading's objective criteria, the gap was even wider - with Labour lagging 19% behind the SNP.  Interestingly, this outcome echoes (and amplifies) the results of YouGov's pre-election polling, which recorded an SNP lead over Labour amongst C2DE voters of a magnitude varying from 4% to 15% in the constituency vote and -1% to 10% in the regional vote. Interestingly at the beginning of the campaign, the polls suggested that ABC1 voters remained to be convinced by the Nationalists, holding on the Labour allegiances more tenaciously than their C2DE fellow citizens. According to Mitchell's data, bourgeois participants in the Survey reported the following voting behaviour, with the same subjective then objective analysis...

Respondents subjectively identifying as middle class...
  • SNP ~ 37%
  • Labour ~ 16%
  • Tories ~ 22%
  • Liberals ~ 8%
  • Greens ~ 9%
  • Others ~ 8%

And according to social grading's objective criteria...

AB voters (upper middle & middle classes)...
  • SNP ~ 41%
  • Labour ~ 25%
  • Tories ~ 14%
  • Liberals ~ 5%
  • Greens ~ 8%
  • Others ~ 7%

And...

C1 voters (lower middle classes)
  • SNP ~ 41%
  • Labour ~ 25%
  • Tories ~ 17%
  • Liberals ~ 8%
  • Greens ~ 6%
  • Others ~ 3%

The rather bizarre looking results of the subjective social class findings - 22% of which is Tory - can probably be explained by factoring in a third option given to respondents - to subjectively identify with no social class at all.  Amongst those respondents, the results were striking - and as follows.

Respondents subjectively identifying as having no class...
  • SNP ~ 53%
  • Labour ~ 17%
  • Tories ~ 14%
  • Liberals ~ 4%
  • Greens ~ 4%
  • Others ~ 8%

Professor Mitchell's slides also lays out the voting data according to national identity - with an interesting and sensitive range of options being afforded to those questioned, allowing those answering to give priority to British or Scottish identities, declare an equivalence between them, or to deny either. The Professor also sets down voting by religious affiliation, albeit with a fairly limited range of categories. Three in fact: no religion; Church of Scotland or Catholic. The data on these issues can be found on his ninth slide. No doubt the Study will generate plenty of other eccentric pieces of data to keep amateur psephologists in the public cheered and distracted from their other labours, for some time to come.