Machiavelli on Scottish independence...

Machiavelli seemed the obvious author to think of when Gaddafi’s violent death in Libya was reported. Although there still appears to be a popular appetite for brutal tyrannicide, the Italian statesman’s prescription that the incoming Prince should obliterate the entire ruling dynasty of his predecessors if he is to be secure, seems more likely to prompt pangs of conscience than the general British twingelessness that accompanied the dictator’s killing. Having revisited the Prince, I went back to Machiavelli’s less well-known work, the Discourses on Livy, which is similarly concerned with the getting and holding of power, though speaks more directly to the predicaments of republics than principalities. While I’d baulk at any simple reading-across from Machiavelli to contemporary Scottish nationalism, I was particularly struck by the resonances of the following passage. While despots and tyrants should “renovate” everything in their new fief, upending hierarchies, dispersing populations, shattering and reshaping institutions, for those who do not seek a tyrannical sway, Machiavelli contends that…

“He who desires or proposes to change the form of government in a state and wishes it to be acceptable and to be able to maintain it to everyone’s satisfaction, must needs retain at least the shadow of its ancient customs, so that institutions may not appear to its people to have been changed, though in point of fact the new institutions may be radically different from the old ones. This he must do because men in general are as much affected by what a thing appears to be as by what it is, indeed they are frequently influenced more by appearances than by reality.”

The quotation scratched an itch of mine which I’m still attempting adequately to articulate. I thought I’d sketch my twinge here, and see what you all make of it. Given the SNP leadership’s now longstanding gradualist independence strategy, one wonders if Angus Robertson or Alex Salmond keeps a little copy of Machiavelli tucked inside his coat pocket. Whether it is the retention of the monarchy, or the idea that an independent Scotland should retain a unicameral parliament elected on a proportional basis, or remain in the EU, or retain pounds sterling, independence is being advanced – at least by the SNP – on the thesis of “minimal difference”. Adopting the gradual politics of the patient salami-slicer, the project is by soft degrees to narrow the gap between independence and the powers already accrued to devolved institutions. Squeezing a yawning political chasm into a slender fissure, ultimately this gradualism envisages that the electorate will be asked to make nothing like a leap towards independence. Step by step. Hop skip jump. Just a little thing, in the end. This approach wisely recognises human caution, with its concern for things practically realised over the abstractly appealing. But there’s a snag; at least for contemporary exponents of this sort of gradualist strategy. Unless something decidedly unexpected happens to the final Scotland Bill, in 2011 and in 2014 and 2015, the Scottish electorate will be invited to take nothing like the last sedate step envisaged here.

That being the case, I find myself wondering, what are the political limits of this nationalism of “minimal difference”, in circumstances where a gradualist-little-step idea of independence is simply implausible? As David Torrance notes in the revised second edition of his biography of Alex Salmond, writing about SNP ideological (in)coherence…

“The unifying factor was a belief in (varying degrees of) independence, but many leasing proponents of that ‘big idea’ held different hopes and aspirations for an independent Scotland. Paul Henderson Scott, for example, wanted it to be pacifist (not a view shared by the SNP’s defence spokesman Angus Robertson); Michael Fry to unleash neoliberalism; Joyce Macmillan to salvage social democracy; Gerry Hassan to think big and positive, and so on. The point, as the party frequently insisted, was that ‘Scots would decide’ what the New Scotland looked like, although it seemed unlikely all of them would be happy with the end result.” (Salmond: Against the Odds (2011), p. 412).

How to keep this ragbag coalition of (N/n)ationalist opinion together, with its divergent conceptions of what a just Scottish state would look like, while advocating a sufficiently potent and concrete conception of what Scottish independence would and could do, to justify the effort? I’ve written before about “being the cartographers of a new Scotland”, worrying about the proposition that the SNP should be regarded as simply “a vehicle to deliver independence, which will then afford an opportunity to choose what sort of state to choose to be”.

Not being in the envisaged “end phase” of gradualist Scottish nationalism, I worry that any strategies premised primarily on reassurance of the electorate just won’t cut it. Let’s be frank. Scottish independence is no small step for the nation to take, and strategies suggesting otherwise just won’t do. Put simply – and exceedingly tritely - if I go to sleep one night in the United Kingdom, and you tell me I will wake up to dawn in an independent Scotland and nothing substantial will have changed – you may feel reassured, but seriously, why bother?

I do recognise the tricky balance between spooking the electorate and making a concrete case for independence’s transformative potential. As I noted, this is an attempt to articulate a niggling anxiety – a tension if you like – rather than a programmatic critique of anyone. For myself, I can’t find much vividness in any overly-inclusive case for independence from the SNP in our political situation, basically amounting to delivering the bare autonomy to decide in future what sort of society and state we should have, with the SNP as neutral arbiters between the conflicting ideologies of its Frys and Macmillans. I don’t see how such a gingerly constructed case can be compatible with a serious-minded civic nationalism, premised on authentic, plausible and meaningfully elaborated social democratic political commitments.

I was struck by the enthusiasm generated by Gerry Hassan’s latest Scotsman column, “From the ‘How’ to the ‘Why’ of Scottish Independence”, with eleven specific areas addressed, encompassing poverty, inequality, defence, Europe, foreign affairs – and UK Tory government. This lively response was no doubt partly generated by folk who share Gerry’s range of political concerns and commitments, and find the vista thus painted to be a compelling one. In his recent speech in Inverness, Alex Salmond repeated the idea that the SNP must “take sides in Scotland as well as taking Scotland’s side”. Gerry’s article demonstrates the extent to which, I believe, Salmond’s logic must be extended to our thinking about independence. While a desire for inclusion is no bad thing, we haven’t got the luxury of the relaxed gradualist, well down his road towards independence. Not being in circumstances of “minimal difference” between Union and not, different expedients seem called for. It is insufficient for the SNP simply to take the side of an independent Scotland. We must also take sides, on what sort of Scotland that ought to be.

Scottish independence "Tomorrow & tomorrow & tomorrow..."

Gradualist? Fundamentalist? Idealist? Pragmatist? Today? Tomorrow? Its a familiar saw of Scots political analysis that the SNP is lifted by the collective motion of two wings. While memories of the '79 Group have not been entirely displaced, it should be striking that no political correspondent refers to right-wing SNP MSPs. In my experience, all such analysis is undertaken on a case-by-case basis. I've heard Fergus Ewing, for example, being referred to as "basically a Tartan Tory", while a muted but detectable strain of commentary seems to think that Nicola Sturgeon tacks more to the left. The French Revolutionary categories of right and left aren't the wings I have in mind. Rather, I'm talking about the opposition drawn between so-called gradualists and fundamentalists in the nationalist cause. 

"Gradualism" 

The first, ideologically dominant, pinion in the party posits that soft degrees and incremental development is the best way to make mild the prospect of final independence. Unionism is here taken not to be an incorrigible matter of principle and solidarity. Rather, it regards the present dispensation as only held up by its own dead weight, by inertia, fear, a sense of dependency. The clear and present purpose of nationalist politics, then, is demonstrating broad shoulders and the potential robustness of an independent nationalist alternative. Like besuited Stoic sages, a gradualist position does not invite the people to take Scottish independence as an article of faith, but seeks to erect props and foundations - a Scottish structure within the British structure - which seems mountingly robust on its own. Rather than ramshackle promises, gradualism wants to point to existing bricks and mortar, settled associations of laws, powers and competencies - making cutting the final threads of dependency an easier snip. It takes the electorate to be cautious - but potentially coaxed into more radical constitutional moves, if perceptions of risk are clearly minimised.

"Fundamentalism"

An alternative argument might be that such gradualist degrees of development are a primose path, leading nowhere. Frustrated with the persistent deferring of full independence till an unspecified tomorrow, a fundamentalist might well suggest that contra gradualist imaginings - lapping up small concessions and superficial empowerment of Scottish institutions make independence less not more likely. Distracting the people from arguments about their own nationalist self-interest, such distractions play into the hands of more Machiavellian Unionists, who in tight spots may well concede an alleviating sop or two, better to shore up the stability of the pernicious system and infinitely defer the "moment" of independence.  Gradualist promises of tomorrow are, in actuality, a thistle-jagged way to nowhere and their apparently canny increments are merely the lulling crotchets and quavers of a self-deluded Pied Piper, lulled by his own music. Make the argument, convince the people, seize the day! If the public are not convinced, it is because of the vacuity of your arguments, the want of articulate spokespersons, a failure of advocacy. The answer is not minimising the apparent risks associated with independence, rather it is explaining the position better.

Beyond "gradualism & fundamentalism"

Such old binaries are rather too precise for my liking, and in particular, conceal an important third group in the SNP who do not, per se, share the central premise of either group, but who will undoubtedly have more significant sympathy with their fellow-travellers resorting to gradualist expedients. Are you in favour of independence, most folk will ask you if they detect your SNP affiliations? A surprising number of people give you equivocal answers to this question or ask - what do you mean by independence? In particular, if there is a sensitivity to what independence might mean in the "interconnected world", the response may be radically different. 

SNP not a "Nationalist"

As the Sunday Herald once put it "people join the SNP because of a belief in independence, rather than because of a shared set of values about how society should be governed. Most parties are a coalition of kindred spirits; the SNP is a loose grouping of diverse ideologies." I disagree and have seen plenty of evidence that many, many people in their party who have their doubts about "full independence" and who might well rest easily enough with a structure of significant federalised power within a transformed United Kingdom. Don't let's forget, after all, that the present Cabinet Secretary for Education, Michael Russell, advocated just such a "New Union" in 2006 in Grasping the Thistle. While the alea iacta est of an independence referendum forces one to take a position - yea or nay - for the sympathetic but fundamentally undecided, the accretion of new powers, new competencies, new possibilities - they are far more readily supportable. Some may well want to excoriate these souls for their want of commitment and thumb accusingly at their weak nationalist nerves and hie them to the Liberal Democrats. For myself, I find this position perfectly understandable. Notice that we could also rearticulate a more cynical version of the same position, which is not simply indecisive on independence - but is even hostile to it. On this account, the SNP could be seen as the best instrument for realising further devolution of power from the centralised institutions of UK politics. Those poised nationalists of this mould, having secured the desired concessions, might well flee the coop - or make a bid to fundamentally shift the Scottish National Party's central mission and central account of its purpose. I see no reason to insist that these folk are not 'real' nationalists or that they do not belong in the party.

Politics in the Heraclitan fire

The thing which strikes me about all three groupings whose arguments I've tried to present is that they are all of them making some calculation or assessment about causality. For example, the SNP non-Nats are making a strategic use of the party to secure a different Union. They guess that in doing so, there is nothing inevitable about independence. The gradualists, with whom the SNP non-Nats may well largely agree - up to a point  - alternatively tend to suggest one or two things about the strategy of degrees. The first, more confident group of gradualists are likely to claim that they can see a logic of necessity underpinning the devolution of power. The final step is the logical conclusion of the first. Devolution begets independence, simpliciter. Alternatively, other gradualists may be suspicious of such claims about iron laws of history. Instead of independence being necessitated in any simply way by more and more powers, their eye is on the strength of the case. Their argument is that it will be easier to convince people of independence, once fiscal autonomy is in place, once we know we can pay our own way and have the institutional props of a contemporary nation state. Its important to recognise that this remains a conditional result, no inevitability of outcome here. The only unavoidable claim this second category of gradualists make about independence is that it will be inevitably easier to convince the people of the virtues of independence, by demonstrating its plausibility in a concrete, stable, competent fashion.

Fundamentalists are likely to dispute this, arguing that the consolidation affected by gradualists does not have this unavoidable effect. These critics are likely to be sensitive to the "problem" of SNP-not-Nats and the attenuation of support that, they suggest, may well bedevil nationalists if devolution is done properly. In an exquisite historical irony, this perspective basically reiterates George Robertson's much-quoted dictum - proper and more substantive "devolution will kill nationalism stone dead". The moment when independence might have been possible was not seized - impetuses behind self-determination falling behind more anaemic schedules of proposals - with the result that all political will is spent and Scotland will remain bound-in with the United Kingdom for the foreseeable future. Fundamentalist Macbeths wring their hands and cry ~

To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury
Signifying nothing."
~ Shakespeare's Macbeth (Act 5, Scene 5)

Good luck to all prophets and seekers after certainties and inevitabilities in this mutable world of ours, that's my motto. For myself, I think it is crucial that we pay attention to what is possible. Actually, I think there may well be something in the fundamentalist argument I've presented above. All talk of inevitabilities and iron laws are suspect and I see absolutely no reason to presume that gradualist gains unavoidably advance towards independence. Rather, I'm much more in sympathy with the second version of gradualism which I formulated - clear structures give confidence, make the case easier to make, make the leap smaller. That, and far more importantly, they give you the basis of doing a good deal of political good in the mean time. I'm no fan of rhetorical resorts to fatuous sunlit uplands of independence. We'll still be crowded around with the naked rock, sheer slopes, the remorseless sleet and the tripping heather underboot. Inertia doesn't keep us upright. Every day we choose to adhere to old ways, existing structures - we collectively revivify our structures. History doesn't keep ancient monuments standing. They keep their straight backs because of the polishings and mendings of the present. The best of Scottish nationalism, in its best moments, is to remind us always and imminently of our ongoing responsibility for the polity we choose to live in. It faces Scotland with the challenges of consciousness and the chastening of responsibilities.

How to understand the independence referendum?

So what does this mean for the referendum on independence? Yesterday, in anticipation of this more lengthy treatment, I linked to a Telegraph story suggesting that the Maximum Eck is deliberately letting it be known (or alternatively, Reform Scotland's Ben Thomson is astoundingly indiscreet) that he intends to focus on the promise, the possibilities, presented by the new Con-Dem government and their apparent willingness to concede Calman powers - and beyond - to the Scottish Parliament and Government. In the comments left below (for which I'm grateful - they assisted significantly in the formulation of the foregoing) Dubbieside suggests that we shouldn't be surprised by the anti-Eck anti-Nat tenor of the story - a great and shameful revelation serving to agitate the troops and depress the nationalist activist base. The rest of this post should be taken as a riposte to simplified accounts of nationalist politics - and SNP supporters - on the question of independence. 

We don't all share the same goals - the same stratagems - the same confidence in how best to pursue the end that (most of us) share. There may be some, for example, who argue for a referendum based on a sort of expressivist moment for Scottish nationalism, charging down the barrels of a hostile Unionist press, the people having their say, probably resulting in a plucky defeat but a sense of compensating emotional vindication. I'm certainly not of that understanding. It is worth admitting then that the referendum, from the very beginning, is a potentially divisive instrument. From a fundamentalist, instantist position, it seems an obvious course of action. For those with more inclination to persuade by soft degrees, support for a referendum is more poised, more concerned with the outcomes, the consequences - rather than a futile but compensating nationalist politics of protest. In particular, it is worth noting that Salmond and Shoal's declared approach of demonstrating competence to give confidence to the Scottish people, if the polls are anything to go on, has not worked. Political opponents, Unionist jobgobbers and mauling fundamentalists are content to give a lazy account of this phenomenon, denying the complexity underlining pollster's questions about support for independence, yea or nay. From a gradualist angle, this is perfectly understandable. Any enthusiastic nationalist will regularly be assailed by doubters, particularly on matters fiscal and financial. Can Scotland pay for itself? How would it work? Douce Dame Caution's dainty slippers continue to warm the voter's toes. All of this is absolutely not to say that the first SNP Government has had no consequences for the nationalist project. Fundamentally, I'd argue that it has realigned the sense of the possible, as it ought to. However, at present, the Parliament and Ministers' economic dependency is such that it represents a substantial stumbling block, not only to adopting economic policies in the interests of Scotland, but also for the gradualist nationalist case.

There is absolutely no prospect at present of a declaration of Scottish independence. For those of us who want to empower Scottish institutions now, emotivist fundamentalism is a wholly arid prospect. Let's be frank about that. And franker too about the different perspectives we can find within the party and among those Scots people who support us. Don't let's make the mistake of making the perfect the enemy of the good.

Salmond leaps: "dropping independence for the time being"

I've been a mite busy these last few days, cheerfully but largely frivolously so. I wanted to anticipate tomorrow's post on the subject by drawing your attention, in case you missed it, to this story from the Torygraph of the 29th of May entitled 'Alex Salmond “drops independence for the time being”'. Naming their source as Ben Thomson of Reform Scotland, the paper outlines, albeit in loose detail, Salmond nodding and winking to Thomson that his central goal is making Scotland “fiscally responsible” and “dropping the ideas of independence for a time”. This statement, suggests the article, is not denied by that most slippery of Scots fishes, the Greater Tun-Bellied Salmond. I stress, no promise here of ditching the anticipated bill to hold a referendum. Rather, I fancy, a question of emphasis. Emphasis on securing new - and permanent - shifts towards the economic empowerment of Holyrood and Scots institutions. In short, the dynamics seem to have changed since Labour left office and the Liberal Democrats entered it. A possibility presents itself to advance the gradualist position in a way that the independence referendum, at present, seems unable to supply.

Is this a leap upstream? Or a painful smack in the guts for Scottish nationalist politics as it impacts against the naked rock and sharp shoals that seem to be shoring up a new Unionism? Will it propel Eck towards independent spawning grounds - or send his form bouncing bruisingly back out to a sea of electoral sterility? Is failing to emphasise independence a problem, or a strength? What might such institutional changes - if extensive and convincing - do to the Nationalist movement anyway? Are there risks here as well as prospects, which we would do well to try and think about nowish? There has been relatively little discussion of this in the Scottish blogosphere as far as I can make out, supportive or critical. I intend to have my say about some of these issues, some time tomorrow.