2015: An Ugly Stramash

The morning of the 19th of September 2014.  A slate sky, rain falling. In London, a whey-faced David Cameron emerges from Downing Street, shielded by trembling flunkies, black umbrellas buffeted by the autumn weather.  A shock of camera flashes accompany a chorus of cries from the damp knot of the press: "You've lost the United Kingdom, Prime Minister. Will you resign?" 

Elsewhere in the imperial capital, a red tie unravelled about his neck, Ed Miliband scores wearily through the north-most corner of his 2015 map of general election battlegrounds and constituencies. Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage snore soundly on through.  

For some of you, convinced already that the Yes campaign is stuffed, this is an impossible future.  Others may regard it as unlikely. But for the sake of January fun, let's treat it as a serious possibility. Say, by a slim or healthier margin, Scotland endorses independence.  Much has and will be written about how this affects Scotland. Less attention has been paid to how such an outcome will impact on the short-term politics of what is left of the United Kingdom.

Despite their endless appetite court-politics and ferment surrounding arguments and positioning for 2015, few metropolitan commentators have applied their minds to this question, convinced that a No vote is inevitable. Unless they buck up their ideas over the next nine months, and try a little counter-factual thinking, they may be in for a nasty, if entertaining shock.

So Salmond wins out. Negotiations for independence begin. And within a scanty few months, we're in May, and the 2015 general election campaign. Do Scottish constituencies still send MPs to Westminster? In all likelihood.  Firstly, some reasons of principle. During the transition from 2014 to 2016, Scotland will retain an interest in a number of matters reserved to Westminster.  The democratic principle demands some sort of a say in that. This problem might be largely answered by devolving further powers to Holyrood over various matters currently reserved to Westminster: welfare say, and taxation.  

But here we encounter a couple of practical snags. If the Westminster government refuse to engage in any serious pre-referendum negotiations, there will be no time - governmental or parliamentary - to devolve any powers between October 2014 and May 2015, or for that matter, to rejig Westminster's electoral map to exclude Scottish constituencies from the general election before the vote.  The smart money says that the election goes ahead as planned. Instead of trying to resolve the tensions it will cause using legal and institutional means, muddling through in a classically British style. At least until after 2015 when we might reasonably expect Westminster to adopt reforms to exclude Scottish members from the Commons, on Independence Day.

So the election goes ahead. But the Scots, being curious, fickle sorts, follow the same parliamentary tactics they pursued in 2010: the first past the post system gives Labour its accustomed landslide. Michael Settle wonders if the public might not give the SNP a boost. But let's say that old habits die hard, and the ballot boxes come out red. And across the rest of the United Kingdom? That is a rather trickier one to call. So let's not, and consider each of the likely outcomes in turn.  

This has the recipe for political disaster, however you slice it. Let's start with the easiest to justify: a Tory majority or a re-elected Liberal-Tory coalition, enjoying majority support in England and Wales. If the results of the 2011 Holyrood election is anything to go by, the 2015 general election is unlikely to be kind to Scottish Liberal Democrats. The party currently holds eleven seats north of the border, clustered around the Highlands and Islands and Aberdeenshire, with pockets of support in the borders, well-heeled bits of Edinburgh and Fife. 

Assuming that hostility to the party does not significantly abate by next year, Tory and Liberal representation might match the number of Scottish pandas, with Orkney and Shetland's Alistair Carmichael joining David Mundell in the enclosure. If 2015 generates a Tory or Tory-Liberal majority, it is likely to do so outside of Scotland. The elimination of Scottish representation some time in 2016 is not likely to impact on the perceived legitimacy of that government.

The election of any permutation of Labour government - minority, coalition or majority - poses far more significant problems of legitimacy. Despite the mythology to the contrary, we know that Labour has not relied on Scotland for any of its recent general election victories (1997, 2001, 2005). But the worst case scenario in 2015 is (a) the election of a Labour majority with Scottish MPs which evaporates without those MPs. It is inconceivable that MPs representing Scottish constituencies could serve out their full term in the UK parliament, influencing English policy, and sustaining Ed Miliband's premiership. 

Say, for the sake of argument, that the UK elects a Labour majority with Scotland, but a Tory or a narrow Tory-Liberal majority without them.  If the Labour majority installs Ed, it can expect to lose its mandate some time in 2016, and to find its legitimacy constantly questioned in the media, as it relies on its Scottish MPs to impose policies affecting only England and Wales: the West Lothian question on acid. This is likely to be particularly problematic, if Labour stands on a prospectus, as it is likely to, focussing on public services in England and Wales. 

If, by contrast, the Labour party exercises a self-denying ordinance in recognition of the referendum result, David Cameron would find himself presiding over a minority government in the House of Commons.  Would - could - the majority Labour opposition resist the temptation to use its ultra montane , defeated and embittered Scottish unionist majority to interfere? In this scenario, the only credible option is another general election as early as 2016, to elect the government of what remains of the United Kingdom, an abrupt change of government with the disappearance of Scottish members without an election, or perhaps an unstable minority administration. 

The consequences of independence for the centre of British politics has generally not troubled the imaginations of metropolitan commentators. It should.  Even on their preferred terrain of short term political tactics, a Yes vote followed by the General Election is likely to transform the political calculus of both Labour, Liberal and Conservative parties.  

The short-to-medium term instability which may result also has significant implications for the negotiations to unpick Scotland from the United Kingdom. There is a significant possibility that any Labour-led UK government involved in negotiations enjoys questionable authority, and a risk of governmental change at the tail end of the process in 2016. This may be less problematic if there is a degree of unanimity between UK Labour and the Tories on the approach to be taken in the negotiations.  It is a recipe for difficulty if the favoured approach of the main parties diverge.  

At this stage, I don't think one can predict with any certainty which party - Labour or Tory - is liable to be more sympathetic negotiators for an independent Scotland to deal with. Nor, I think, is it obvious whether any UK governmental instability is likely to be a boon or a bother.  On the one hand, political disorganisation seems likely to favour the more organised delegation, with clearer aims and goals. On the other, time is of the essence and the distraction of one party to the negotiations is not likely to increase the celerity with which agreements may be reached - a problem for the First Minister.  

From the viewpoint of of stability, the best outcome for independence supporters in 2015 is the re-election of a Tory or Tory-Liberal majority coalition or a roaring performance by Ed's band, securing a majority from England and Wales without their Scots comrades. But Fortune (and the electoral system) rarely smiles so kindly on us.  We'd better all be ready for an ugly stramash.