tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post7405107621016238919..comments2024-03-28T07:16:39.621+00:00Comments on Lallands Peat Worrier: Assisted dying: bringing a little lightLallands Peat Worrierhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18276270498204697708noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post-35373684098624462842016-03-02T10:45:16.910+00:002016-03-02T10:45:16.910+00:00I can agree about the freight, but not about the c...I can agree about the freight, but not about the causation. The dichotomy you draw between causation as investigated in philosophy and causation as used in the law is a false one. <br /><br />You say "In some ways it seems - to me - a false designation of the decision-making process, to suggest it is mainly about whether the accused caused X or Y." Of course, I did not make any such "designation".<br /><br />There is a deep and interesting connection between being a cause of, and being responsible for (in all its various guises), an outcome, and it is very much the domain of philosophy to consider that connection. Part of the philosophical process is to consider how causal ascriptions, and ascriptions of responsibility, appear in ordinary discourse, in technical contexts, and in the law. To treat the philosophical progress here as irrelevant is ignorant, and that ignorance narks me. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09822366366881212858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post-26429690692679858722016-03-01T13:43:31.164+00:002016-03-01T13:43:31.164+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01629777883184151369noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post-76788219376225996392016-02-28T17:57:11.111+00:002016-02-28T17:57:11.111+00:00Neil,
If you are narked by me -- then you're ...Neil,<br /><br />If you are narked by me -- then you're certainly doomed, as I am considerably more interested and engaged and respectful of your philosophical endeavours than most of my comrades in the law. I hope I don't misunderstand it. The point I was trying to make was - legal "causation" isn't (exclusively) about philosophical "causation". In some ways it seems - to me - a false designation of the decision-making process, to suggest it is mainly about whether the accused caused X or Y. In deciding about the scope of legal causation, judges don't ask themselves -- "is this philosophically robust?" At least, not most of the time, and certainly not in the harder cases. The splice between different disciplines is more often fraught than not; not least because we bring different freight with us, and don't notice.Lallands Peat Worrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18276270498204697708noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post-62886336353052147242016-02-28T15:14:00.873+00:002016-02-28T15:14:00.873+00:00Well, in that case I guess I think you badly misun...Well, in that case I guess I think you badly misunderstand the (de facto) scope of philosophy, (which would of course help explain lack of cross pollination I am bemoaning above). Philosophy is almost entirely "conceptual" and is interested in exactly the issues of responsibility (and the role of normatively) you point to. It is concerned with both the abstruse inapplicable details that the law can safely ignore, and the entirely applicable, practical, and decision-relevant issues that the law is concerned with. The relationship between causation and responsibility is a case in point, as the judgements above make plain. I know the progress that has been made in that area, and I believe it is important and relevant, but you are plainly unaware of that progress and have decided that you're "not really interested". That is pretty frustrating.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09822366366881212858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post-54779064617387462582016-02-28T13:33:18.135+00:002016-02-28T13:33:18.135+00:00We'll have to file this one under the heading ...We'll have to file this one under the heading - "law is conceptual, not philosophical", to paraphrase Bruto Latour, from memory. Although the concepts it deploys are recognisably connected to philosophical concepts, in deciding the scope of legal causation -- to my eye -- we're not really interested in getting the causation analysis philosophically right, and consistent and justifiable. Really, "legal causation" here is just a form of distributing responsibility. It is a normative concept for attributing blame, given a conceptual veneer. The same goes for many of the novus actus interveniens scenarios. Take one of the most famous from south of the border - R v Blaue - where a victim is stabbed, but dies as the result of refusing a blood transfusion for religious reasons. In asking whether or not the accused should be held guilty of murder, it seems to me, the courts aren't really asking whether or not he caused the death. False friends.Lallands Peat Worrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18276270498204697708noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post-33898727627015528712016-02-28T13:27:50.529+00:002016-02-28T13:27:50.529+00:00From the decision at first instance, I was quite s...From the decision at first instance, I was quite skeptical whether this JR would produce anything constructive at all. Always positive to be positively disappointed.Lallands Peat Worrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18276270498204697708noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post-84647470406303442022016-02-26T23:16:21.201+00:002016-02-26T23:16:21.201+00:00An interesting case, and a good outcome as you say...An interesting case, and a good outcome as you say LPW. I hope it survives as a piece of legal interpretation. I am, however, baffled but he idea that 'direct and immediate cause' is a genuine line in the sand here. It works in the right way in the sort of case above - it insulates the assisting party from culpability - but it does seem to suggest that as long as I use a *sufficiently* convoluted and distal means (perhaps via several stooges) of bringing about, say, the detonation of a bomb, I cannot be considered culpable for the destruction it causes. <br /><br />Of course I am culpable, and the retreat to the claim that cases are 'fact sensitive' is just another way of saying 'we know culpability when we see it, don't ask for a consistent rationale'. I don't like that one bit.<br /><br />For what it is worth, I think that the difficulty in finding the rule in question is a serious, but tractable, issue, and one where lots of progress has been made in the last decade or so in the philosophy of causation. It is regrettable that much of that progress has yet to find its way out of the metaphysics classroom (I recently missed out on funding aiming to do exactly that) but I think some good things have been said on the relevant issues in Moore:<br /><br />http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.001.0001/acprof-9780199256860 Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09822366366881212858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1638916042737526171.post-29839902306077840082016-02-25T11:26:23.166+00:002016-02-25T11:26:23.166+00:00We all hope we'll never be obliged to use this...We all hope we'll never be obliged to use this option, but what a relief this must be to those who do.<br /><br />Thank you for the clarification.<br /><br />I echo your remarks about Gordon Ross.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com